BRITISH ARMY CRIMEAN WAR ALMA REDOUBT STORMERS GROUP MEDALS GENERAL DONOVAN

A notable 'Great Redoubt stormer's' group of four to Lieutenant-General Edward Westby Donovan, 33rd Foot, credited with capturing a 24-pound brass howitzer at the Battle of the Alma on 20 September 1854; for performing a similar feat, Captain Bell of the 23rd Foot received the Victoria Cross.

Donovan was severely wounded in the trenches before Sebastopol, his 'zealous service' praised in Lord Raglan's despatches.

Crimea 1854-56, 3 clasps, Alma, Inkermann, Sebastopol engraved in large serif capitals Major E. W. Donovan. 33rd Regt. (officially engraved by Hunt & Roskell); France, Second Empire, Legion of Honour, 5th Class breast Badge, silver, gold centre and enamel; Turkey, Ottoman Empire, Order of the Medjidie, 5th Class breast Badge, silver, gold and enamel; Turkish Crimea, British issue, replacement scroll suspension, all fitted with silver top riband buckles, very fine. Comes with file of copied research including newspaper articles and a copied picture.

Legion of Honour London Gazette 4 August 1856. Order of the Medjidie London Gazette 2 March 1858.

Lt. General Edward Westby Donovan was born 6/9/1821 in Wexford Ireland. The second son of Richard Donovan J.P Ballymore County Wexford. (Ballymore branch of the O'Donovans of Clan Loughlin. He was commissioned as an Ensign into the 33^rd (West Riding) Regiment of Foot, without purchase, on 10 January 1840. He advanced to Lieutenant on 14 June 1842 and Captain on 22 December 1848. The title 'The Duke of Wellington's Regiment' was granted on 18 June 1853.

The 33^rd Foot was stationed at Gibraltar, where it remained from 1836 until 1841. 1841-1844, the West Indies for three years. In that period six officers and 156 NCOs and men died from yellow fever and other causes. From 1844 the 33^rd was in Nova Scotia, returning to the UK in 1848. When the Crimean War broke out in 1854 the regiment was in Ireland.

Edward’s brother  Lieutenant Henry George Donovan who was serving in the 33^rd Regiment was killed in this battle. Most unusual it would appear that he was with the Regiment in action as a civilian.

In the 33rd, Lieutenant Donovan, a most promising and dashing officer, lost his life while looking over the parapet at the fight. He went with the regiment as an amateur, in company with his brother, all through Bulgaria, and into action with them at the Alma as a volunteer, where he so much distinguished himself that the Colonel recommended him for a commission, which he received without purchase.

Donovan served with the 33rd in the Crimean War, playing a conspicuous role at the Alma on 20 September 1854. Part of Sir George Brown's Light Division, the 33rd scaled the south bank of the river under galling fire, capturing the Great Redoubt. Some weeks earlier, the Tsar expressly decreed that no Russian gun was to fall into enemy hands (Pemberton 1962, 48). As a result, the gunners in the Great Redoubt frantically limbered up as the British infantry drew near. In the case of a brass 24-pound howitzer, they left it too late. According to Regimental tradition, Donovan was the first to scratch his name onto the captured piece. Captain Bell of the 23rd Foot was awarded the Victoria Cross for capturing a Russian gun during the same action, in similar circumstances (see Carter 1861, 16). Like the 23rd Foot on their left flank, the 33rd were thrown into confusion by the Vladimir Regiment's counter-attack, suffering casualties of 1 officer and 55 other ranks killed, 6 officers and 177 other ranks wounded (Hope 2003, 115).

Donovan was severely wounded in the trenches before Sebastopol, his 'zealous service' praised in Lord Raglan's despatches.

Donovan rose to become Colonel of his Regiment on 31 January 1863, and on 28 October advanced to Major-General. On 18 June 1881 he was appointed to command all land forces in China and the Straits Settlements. He retired from the Army on 1 April 1887, with the honorary rank of Lt. General, and died ten years later.

Battle of Alma.

At the Alma, Prince Menshikov, commander-in-chief of Russian forces in the Crimea, decided to make his stand on the high ground south of the river. Although the Russian Army was numerically inferior to the combined Franco-British force (35,000 Russian troops as opposed to 60,000 Franco-British troops), the heights they occupied were a natural defensive position, indeed, the last natural barrier to the allied armies on their approach to Sevastopol. Furthermore, the Russians had more than one hundred field guns on the heights they could employ with devastating effect from the elevated position; however, none were on the cliffs facing the sea, which were considered too steep for the enemy to climb.

By mid-morning, the allied army was assembling on the plain, the British on the left of the Sevastopol Road, the French and the Turks on the right, stretching out towards the coast. According to the plan that the allies had agreed upon the day before, the two armies were to advance simultaneously on a broad front and try to turn the enemy's flank on the left further inland. At the final moment, Raglan decided to delay the British advance until the French had broken through on the right; the troops were ordered to lie on the ground, within range of the Russian guns, in a position from which they could scramble to the river when the time was right. They lay there from 13:15 to 14:45, losing men as the Russian gunners found their range.

While the British were holding their advance, on the far right, Gen. Pierre Bosquet's 2nd Division arrived at the river's mouth and encountered steep cliffs rising 50 m above the river. The Russians considered the cliffs so steep that they deemed it unnecessary to defend the position with artillery. Zouaves at the division's head started to swim across the river and rapidly climbed the cliffs using the trees to scale it. Once they had reached the plateau, they engaged the defending forces of the Moscow Regiment and held the position until reinforcements could arrive. Following the Zouaves, more soldiers scaled the cliffs and carried 12 guns up a ravine. The Russian situation became hopeless and they began to retreat.

Attack at the greater redoubt by the British.

The British army was arrayed in two lines; the first consisted of the Light Division on the left and the  2nd Division on the right. Behind them was a second line - the 1st Division, consisting of the Highland and the Guards Brigades, which were deployed to support the first line's advance. The remaining British troops were held in reserve.

The Light Division had not extended itself far enough left and advanced at an angle. Soon, the troops on the right of the Light Division and the left of the 2nd Division began merging. The strategic formation of the British line was lost. Once they had crossed the river, all order was also lost. Companies and regiments became jumbled together, and where the lines had been two men deep, now just a crowd resulted. The Russians, seeing this, began to advance down the hill from either side of the great redoubt, firing on the British below. Maj. Gen. William John Codrington, commander of the Light Division's 1st Brigade, ordered his troops to fix bayonets and advance.

The densely packed Codrington's Brigade started to advance uphill in a thick crowd. Without time and unable to put the soldiers in formation, the officers gave up and urged them to charge toward the Russian guns in the redoubt. As Russian artillery opened fire, the British continued scrambling upward until some of the Light Division's advanced guard tumbled over the walls of the greater redoubt. As the Russians were trying to redeploy their cannons, soldiers clambered over the parapets and through the embrasures, capturing two guns in the confusion. However, realising their lack of reinforcements, and as the Vladimirsky Regiment poured into the redoubt from the open higher ground, British buglers sounded the withdraw order. Russian infantry charged with fixed bayonets, driving out the British and firing at them as they retreated down the hill.

The Light Division's moved from the redoubt, pursued by Russian infantry. The Light Division crashed into the advancing Scots Fusiliers with such force that the line was broken in many places. The Scots faltered, but emerged on the other side with only half their numbers and continued towards the great redoubt in a chaotic state. When they were 40 yd from the redoubt, the Russians mounted a massive volley. The Scots Fusiliers were forced to retreat.

The two other guards' regiments filled the gap left by the Scots Fusiliers, but refused orders to charge with bayonets up the hill. Instead, the Grenadiers and the Coldstream formed into lines and started firing Minié volleys into the Russian advance parties. This stopped the Russians, and the Grenadiers and the Coldstream were soon able to close the gap between them; the Russians were again forced back into the redoubt.

Soon, the fire of the Guards was joined by the 2nd Division on the British right. Its 30th Regiment could clearly see the gunners of three Russian batteries from the riverbank and killed them with their Minié rifles before they could redeploy the guns. As the Russian infantry and artillery withdrew, the British slowly advanced uphill. By 16:00, the allies were converging on the Russian positions from all directions. With the French in command of the cliffs above the Alma, the battle clearly had been virtually decided.

From the book "The British Expedition to the Crimea".

(The reserve artillery horses had succeeded in drawing away all the guns except one, which was still in position, and on this gun, when the first rush was made, an officer of the 33rd, named Donovan, scratched his name.) In broken groups the 23rd, with whom were mingled men of the 19th and 33rd Regiments, rushed at the earthwork, leaped across it, bayoneted a few Russians who offered resistance, and for an instant were masters of the position. Captain Bell, of the 23rd, observed a driver in vain urging by whip and spar two black horses to carry off one of the brass sixteen-pounder guns which had done so much execution. Bell ran up, and, seizing the reins, held a revolver to his head. He dismounted, and ran off. Bell, with the assistance of a soldier of the 7th, named Pyle, led the horses round the shoulder of the parapet to the rear of our line, where the gun remained after the Light Division was obliged to retire, and reported the capture to Sir George Brown. The horses were put into our "black battery." This was but an episode. The colours of the 23rd were planted on the centre of the parapet. Both the colour-officers, Butler and Anstruther, were killed. The colours were hit in seventy-five places, and the pole of one was shot in two; it had to be spliced. Meantime, the Russians, seeing what a handful of men they had to deal with, gained heart. The brigade and the 19th had held the entrenchment for nearly ten minutes, keeping the massive columns above them in check by their desperate but scattered fire.

Inkerman.

On 5 November 1854, the Russian 10th Division, launched a heavy attack on the allied right flank atop Home Hill east from the Russian position on Shell Hill. The assault was made by two columns of 35,000 men and 134 field artillery guns of the Russian 10th Division. When combined with other Russian forces in the area, the Russian attacking force would form a formidable army of some 42,000 men. The initial Russian assault was to be received by the British Second Division dug in on Home Hill with only 2,700 men and 12 guns. Both Russian columns moved in a flanking fashion east towards the British. They hoped to overwhelm this portion of the Allied army before reinforcements could arrive. The fog of the early morning hours aided the Russians by hiding their approach.

When dawn broke, Soymonov attacked the British positions on Home Hill with 6,300 men with 3 regiments. Soymonov also had a further 9,000 in reserve. The British had strong pickets and had ample warning of the Russian attack despite the early morning fog. The pickets, some of them at company strength, engaged the Russians as they moved to attack. The firing in the valley also gave warning to the rest of the Second Division, who rushed to their defensive positions. The British2nd Division commander did not know that he was facing a superior Russian force. Thus he abandoned the plan of falling back to draw the Russians within range of the British field artillery which was hidden behind Home Hill. Instead, he ordered his 2,700 strong division to attack. When they did so, the Second Division faced some 15,300 Russian soldiers.

The Russian infantry, advancing through the fog, were met by the advancing Second Division, who opened fire with their Pattern 1853 Enfield rifles, whereas the Russians were still armed with smoothbore muskets. The Russians were forced into a bottleneck owing to the shape of the valley, and came out on the Second Division's left flank. The rifled Minié balls of the British rifles proved deadly accurate against the Russian attack. Those Russian troops that survived were pushed back at bayonet point. Eventually, the Russian infantry were pushed all the way back to their own artillery positions. The Russians launched a second attack, also on the Second Division's left flank, but this time in much larger numbers and led by Soymonov himself. At this point, after the second attack, the British position was incredibly weak. If Soymonov had known the condition of the British, he would have ordered a third attack before the British reinforcements arrived. Such a third attack might well have succeeded, but Soymonov could not see in the fog and thus did not know of the desperate situation of the British. Instead, he awaited the arrival of his own reinforcements—General Pavlov's men who were making their way toward the Inkerman battlefield in four different prong attacks from the north. However, the British reinforcements arrived in the form of the Light Division which came up and immediately launched a counterattack along the left flank of the Russian front, forcing the Russians back. During this fighting Soymonov was killed by a British rifleman. Russian command was immediately taken up by Colonel Pristovoitov, who was himself shot a few minutes later. Colonel Uvazhnov-Aleksandrov assumed command of the Russian forces. Shortly after, Uvazhnov-Aleksandrov was also killed in the withering British fire. At this point, no officer seemed keen to take up command and Captain Andrianov was sent off on his horse to consult with various generals about the problem.

The rest of the Russian column proceeded down to the valley where they were attacked by British artillery and pickets, eventually being driven off. The resistance of the British troops here had blunted all of the initial Russian attacks. General Paulov, leading the Russian second column of some 15,000, attacked the British positions on Sandbag Battery. As they approached, the 300 British defenders vaulted the wall and charged with the bayonet, driving off the leading Russian battalions. Five Russian battalions were assailed in the flanks by the British 41st Regiment, who drove them back to the River Chernaya.

Allied casualties were: 2,573 British, of whom 635 were killed, and 1,800 French, of whom 175 were killed. Russia lost 3,286 killed within a total (including men taken prisoner) of 11,959 casualties.

Sebastopol.

Sevastopol is one of the classic sieges of all time. The city of Sevastopol was the home of the Tsar's Black Sea Fleet, which threatened the Mediterranean. The Russian field army withdrew before the allies could encircle it. The siege was the culminating struggle for the strategic Russian port in 1854–55 and was the final episode in the Crimean War.

It was during this battle that Edward was severely wounded 15^th April.

At half-past eight o'clock in the evening (15th), three mines, containing 50,000 pounds of powder, were exploded with an appalling crash, in front of the batteries of the French, seventy yards in front of the third parallel. The fourth and principal mine was not exploded, as it was found to be close to the gallery of a Russian mine, and the French were unable to make such a lodgement as was anticipated; but they established themselves in the course of the night in a portion of the outer work. The etonnoirs were, after several days' hard labour and nights of incessant combat, connected with the siege works. The Russians, believing the explosion to be the signal for a general assault, ran to their guns, and for an hour their batteries vomited forth prodigious volumes of fire against our lines from one extremity to the other. The force and fury of their cannonade was astonishing, but notwithstanding the length and strength of the fire, it caused but little damage to the works or to their defenders. Next day the magazine of our eight-gun battery in the right attack was blown up by a shell, and seven of our guns were silenced, but the eighth was worked with great energy by Captain Dixon, R. A., who commanded in the battery.